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The Treaty With Poland Concerning
Business and Economic Relations:
Does It Provide More Incentive
To The American Investor?
Todd Ewing*
"Free competition is worth more to society than it costs."
- Oliver Wendell Holmes
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Among the reformed East European countries now embracing dem-
ocratic notions, Poland has been the most aggressive in the effort to reach
full-fledged democracy. These efforts are reflected by Poland's recent
amendments to its foreign investment law and, most recently, the signing
of a treaty with the United States in hopes of attracting American inves-
tors. This article briefly examines the role and content of this treaty in
the context of the overall United States treaty program and, more impor-
tantly, determines whether the Treaty has the potential to stimulate U.S.
investment above and beyond the incentives now in place under the for-
eign investment law of Poland. While the Treaty covers many areas of
investment, this discussion is limited to four areas which will most likely
influence the U.S. investor; repatriation of profits, entry of investment,
expropriation, and arbitration.
* The author is a Juris Doctor candidate for the Spring 1991 at Drake University School of
Law, Des Moines, Iowa. This work was completed in the Summer of 1990 during an internship at
the United States International Trade Commission, Office of Commissioner Seeley G. Lodwick,
Washington D.C. Contents of this article do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or
any of the Commissioners.
I Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 106, 44 N.E. 1077, 1080 (1896)(Holmes, J., dissenting).
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II. BACKGROUND
The Communist Party was defeated in June 1989 in Poland's first
semi-democratic elections. In August 1989, Poland established the first
noncommunist-led government in the Warsaw Pact. In October 1989,
the Solidarity Party-led government announced a reform package in-
tended to make swift, positive adjustments in the economy. The nature
of these reforms indicated a strong commitment to a free market system.
In a mad dash to enter the free market system, Poland's reform program
took full effect in January 1990. The reform program included changes in
the areas of banking2, foreign exchange', bankruptcy', and antitrust
law5 . Also included in the reform program was recently passed legisla-
tion providing for the privatization of state enterprises, and the dissolu-
tion of unprofitable state enterprises.6
Foreign governments have assisted Poland's transition.7 For exam-
ple, in November 1989, President Bush signed into law the Support for
East European Democracy Act ("SEED").8 This Act authorized $928
million in United States aid to both Poland and Hungary for structural
adjustment, private sector development, implementing trade and invest-
ment programs, and establishing educational, cultural and scientific
activities.9
2 Ustawa z dnia 31 stycznia 1989 r. Prawo bankowe (Banking Law), Dziennik Ustaw [Dz.U.]
No. 4, item 21 (1989); amended by Dz.U. No. 54, item 320 (1989), Dz.U. No. 59, item 350 (1989),
Dz.U. No. 74, item 439 (1989). Ustawa z dnia 31 stycznia 1989 o Narodowym Banku Polskim
(Law on the Polish National Bank) Dz.U. No. 4, item 22 (1989); amended by Dz.U. No. 74, item
439 (1989).
3 Ustawa z dnia 15 lutego 1989 r. Prawo dewizowe (Foreign Exchange Law), Dz.U. No. 6, item
33 (1989); amended by Dz.U. No. 74, item 441 (1989).
4 Rozporzadzenie Prezydenta Rzeczypospolitej z dnia 24 pazdziernika 1934 r. Prawo upadlos-
ciowe, Dz.U. No. 93, item 834 (1934) as amended.
5 Ustawa z dnia 24 lutego 1990 r. o przeciwdzialaniu praktykom monopolistycznym, Dz.U. No.
14, item 88 (1990)).
6 Ustawa o prywatyzacji przedsiebiorstw panstwowych (Law on Privatization of State Enter-
prises), Rzeczpospolita No. 168 (2603), (July 23, 1990). Under the law, the state would convert its
holdings into joint stock companies, selling up to 25% of shares to workers at half the market price
while offering the rest to investors. Workers would be free to buy shares at the preferential rate up to
the amount of one year's pay. Foreigners would need government approval to acquire more than
10% of the stock in a privatized company, although the rule is seen as little more than a formality.
For a more complete explanation of the law, see Lelyveld, Polish Privatization Could Aid Business, J.
COMM. 5A (July 17, 1990); UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ADMINISTRATION, POLAND'S PRIVATIZATION ACT, (July 30, 1990).
7 The Federal Republic of Germany and other European Community members have provided
several billion dollars of loans, grants, and credits to Poland.
8 22 U.S.C.A. § 5401 (West 1990).
9 22 U.S.C.A. § 5401(a). "The United States shall implement, beginning in fiscal year 1990, a
concerted Program of Support for East European Democracy (which may also be referred to as the
"SEED Program"). The SEED Program shall be comprised of diverse undertakings designed to
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While the other East European countries are making only gradual
economic transitions, Poland is moving from a planned economy to a
free-market economy. This rapid change has caught the attention of for-
eign investors. Since the advent of this transition, investment in Poland
has been regarded with both optimism and pessimism. Optimists believe
that Poland's reforms will be successful and, as a result, they advocate
investing in Poland. According to the optimists,the reform movement
has advanced from the dark days of martial law and the suppression of
Solidarity, to not only overthrow communist control, but also to under-
take the plunge into market economics.1 While in the rest of Eastern
Europe political reformation runs only skin deep, optimists say that Po-
land is undergoing a genuine political revolution.11
Pessimists, on the other hand, argue that "a quick jump into free
markets will lead to high expectations and disappointing results."' 2 In
other words, the Poles cannot break the inefficient work habits prevalent
in a centrally planned economy. 3 "They pretend to pay us, and we pre-
tend to work," is an old saying among Polish workers. Some of Poland's
economic leaders have been the pessimists, declaring that Poland's fragile
economy cannot endure the abrupt plunge into a market economy.
14
Some cite the lack of reliable communications and basic financial services
as serious detriments to the country's transition from a centrally planned
economy to a market economy.' 5
Regardless of the future success of reform in Poland, the Poles un-
questionably have undertaken unambiguous and sincere efforts to attract
foreign investment. The Polish Foreign Investment Agency reported
that between the passage of the Foreign Investment Law of 1988 and
July 15, 1990, the government had issued almost 1,500 approvals for for-
eign joint ventures.' 6 These approvals represent $1 billion in investment
last year and $200 million in equity.' 7 It appears that because of abound-
ing incentives for foreign investment, those who advocate a grim future
provide cost-effective assistance to those countries of Eastern Europe that have taken substantive
steps toward institutionalizing political democracy and economic pluralism." Id.
1O House, In East Europe, Only Poland Makes Hard Decisions, Wall St. J., June 5, 1990, at A24,
col. 3.
11 Id.
12 Etzioni, Is Poland Getting Bad Advice?, N.Y. Times (Forum), June 17, 1990, at 13, col. 2.
13 Id.
14 Madrick, Poland's 'Big Bang'. Too Much Too Fast?, N.Y. Times (Forum), May 20, 1990, at
13, col. 3.
15 Id.
16 Lelyveld, Shift to Free-Market Economy Tests Poles' Perseverance, J. COMM., July 17, 1990, at
4A, col. 3. (Reported by Mr. Maslankiewicz of the Foreign Investment Agency).
17 Most of the 1,500 joint ventures have been limited to small deals based on the minimum
investment of $50,000. Only about 30 have reached $1 million in equity. Id.
354
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most likely will be ignored and an increasing number of American com-
panies will set up shop in Poland.
Arguably, the most significant change towards a free-market econ-
omy in Poland's domestic laws has been the creation of the Polish For-
eign Investment Law ("1990 PFIL").18 The 1990 PFIL provides a
plethora of incentives to foreign investors. 19 Among the many advan-
tages granted to foreign investors have been tax breaks, relaxed foreign
exchange standards, and improved operational provisions. Although Po-
land has encouraged foreign investment through favorable legislation
since the 1970s, regulations for foreign businesses were not simplified un-
til the passage of the foreign investment law of 1988.20 The current 1990
PFIL contains many substantive improvements over the 1988 law, but
still lacks clarity in some areas.21 Although the PFIL has made signifi-
cant advances toward attracting foreign investment, some expectations
and demands of foreign investors have been overlooked.
The latest development affecting the interests of U.S. investors is the
recently signed Polish-American Business and Economic Treaty.22 The
Treaty is the first United States investment agreement with Poland or
any other East European country. 23 The purpose of the Treaty is to en-
courage and facilitate U.S. investment by providing internationally rec-
18 Ustawa z dnia 23 grudnia 1988 r. o dzialalnosci gospodarczej z udzialem podmiotow zagran-
icznych (Law on Economic Activity with the Participation of Foreign Parties), Dz.U. No. 41, item
325 (1988), amended by Dz.U. No. 74, item 442 (1989)[hereinafter 1990 PFIL].
19 For a more in depth analysis of the law, see Gordon, The Polish Foreign Investment Law of
1990, 24 INT'L LAW. 335 (1990); Slupinski, The New Polish Joint Venture Law, 3 TRANSNAT'L
LAW. 1 (1990)(discusses 1988 Joint Venture Law, the predecessor to the 1990 PFIL).
20 Dz.U. No. 41, item 325 (1988), supra note 18.
21 The foreign investment law of 1988 was amended in December of 1989 and became effective
on January 1, 1990. The ambiguities may be illustrated by the language of the currency transfers
provision. The expedited process of drafting the laws might be one reason for this ambiguous
language.
22 Treaty With Poland Concerning Business and Economic Relations, March 21, 1990, S.T.
DOC. No. 18, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Treaty]. Although the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee expected the Treaty to receive the advice and consent of the Senate by the end of
September 1990, at the time of this writing the Treaty has not yet been ratified.
23 While this agreement is the first wholly economic agreement between the United States and an
East European country, the United States has entered into several other agreements with Poland in
the past. See, eg., Agreement Relating to Economic and Financial Cooperation, Apr. 24, 1946, 11
Bevans 286; Agreement Relating to Agricultural Commodities, Establishing a Procedure, Dec. 29,
1972-Feb. 5, 1973, 24 U.S.T. 424, T.I.A.S. No. 7557; Joint Statement on the Development of Agri-
cultural Trade, 25 U.S.T. 2763, T.I.A.S. No. 7944; ; Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxa-
tion, July 23, 1976, 28 U.S.T. 891; T.I.A.S. No. 8486; Agreement Relating to Limitation of Imports
of Specialty Steel from Poland, Oct. 18, 1983, T.I.A.S. No. 10901; Arrangement Concerning Trade
in Certain Steel Products, Expired by its terms September 30, 1989; Investment Guaranty Agree-
ment Between Poland and the United States, Oct. 13, 1989, 28 I.L.M. 1393. Source: U.S. Laws and
U.S. and EC Trade Agreements Relating to Nonmarket Economies, Vol. 1, Staff Research Study
#16, USITC Pub. 2269, Office of General Counsel 11-15 (1990).
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ognized protections and standards.24 The Treaty's key elements address
issues of investment, expropriation, transfer of funds, dispute settlement,
business rights, intellectual property rights, creation of an ombudsman
office, tourism, and investment procedures.25 Both countries view the
substance of the Treaty as an effort to satisfy the shortcomings of the
1990 PFIL and to further enhance the attractiveness of the investment
and business environment in Poland.
This article describes how the Treaty increases the incentives for
U.S. investment beyond those provided in the 1990 PFIL. In other
words, this article determines what added incentives for U.S. investment
the Treaty provides for which are not found in the 1990 PFIL. Because
of the unique nature of the Treaty, even among other bilateral investment
treaties, the first portion of this article discusses the Treaty within the
framework of other investment treaties.26 The reader must keep in mind
that the written word cannot keep up with the constant changes occur-
ring in Poland. Therefore, the investor or practitioner would be well-
advised to closely monitor future events in Poland.
III. THE TREATY IN ITS SETTING
The Treaty was negotiated by the Office of the United States Trade
Representative, the Department of Treasury, the Department of State,
and the Department of Commerce pursuant to the provisions of the
SEED Act of 1989.27 Because the SEED Act and its legislative history
specifically urged the President to seek "bilateral investment treaties"
("BITs") with Poland and Hungary,2" the Treaty negotiators attempted
to create a document featuring the structural components of the U.S.
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty ("Prototype").29 Past traditional
BITs have assured the American investor that the host government
would grant them national (i.e., non-discriminatory) treatment; the op-
24 WHITE HousE, OFFICE OF THE PRESS SECRETARY, U.S.-POLISH BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC
TREATY FACT SHEET, March 21, 1990.
25 See Treaty, supra note 22.
26 At the time of this writing, a thorough examination of this subject was being conducted for
publication by Eleanor Roberts Lewis, Chief Counsel for International Commerce at the Depart-
ment of Commerce.
27 These four United States government agencies negotiated the substantive provisions of the
Treaty, while other agencies, in conjunction, participated in the negotiations.
28 SEED Act, supra note 8, at (c)(15). "[This Bill] urges the President to seek bilateral invest-
ment treaties with Poland and Hungary in order to establish a more stable legal framework for
United States investment in those countries." H.R. Rep. No. 278(11), 101st Cong. 2nd Sess. 12,
reprinted in 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 739, 755.
29 Text of the U.S. Model Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment of February 24, 1984, [hereinafter Prototype]. The Department of State has recently
developed a new prototype. The changes from the Prototype appear to be few and insubstantial.
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portunity to submit disputes to binding third-country arbitration; and the
guarantee of fair market compensation for acts of expropriation. As will
be discussed, the Treaty includes not only the traditional BIT provisions,
but also provides additional guarantees such as profit repatriation and
guarantees for entry of investment.
A. A Member of the Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) Family
The BIT program 30 evolved from the Friendship, Commerce and
Navigation ("FCN") treaty program.3 The BIT program was initiated
during the mid-1970s 32 , after several incidents of expropriation of U.S.
investments occurred in developing countries33 . Using a skeletal frame-
work of the FCN treaties, the drafters removed the provisions that did
not pertain to investment protection. The remaining provisions were
then expanded and fortified so as to be more effective than the FCN pro-
visions.3 4 The drafters also applied the basic principles set out by the
successful European Bilateral Investment Protection Agreements
("BIPAs"). 35
The drafters involved in the BIT program wanted BITs to meet
three objectives:
(1) to provide greater protection for United States investment in those
countries with which the United States negotiated BITs,
30 See generally, Recent Development, Developing a Model Bilateral Investment Treaty, 15 LAW
& POL'Y. INT'L. Bus. 273 (1983); Comment, The BIT Won't Bite: The American Bilateral Invest-
ment Treaty Program, 33 AM. U.L. REv. 931 (1984); Bergman, BilateralInvestment Protection Trea-
ties: An Examination of the Evolution and Significance of the U.S Prototype Treaty, 16 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L. L. & POa. 1 (1983); Pattison, The United States-Egypt Bilateral Investment Treaty: A Proto-
type for Future Negotiations, 16 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 305 (1983).
31 See Gudgeon, United States Bilateral Investment Treaties: Comments on their Origin, Pur-
poses, and General Treatment Standards, 4 INT'L TAX & Bus. LAW. 105, 109 (1986). According to
the Department of State's records, FCN treaties are presently in force between the United States and
nearly fifty countries. The FCN program was implemented to modernize U.S. commercial relation-
ships with primary trading partners in the developed countries. Id
32 See Vandevelde, The Bilateral Investment Treaty Program of the United States, 21 CORNELL
INT'L. L.. 201, 209, n. 73. In 1977, during the Carter Administration, the proposals for the BIT
program took the form of memoranda circulated in the State Department. Under the Reagan Ad-
ministration the State Department moved out of the drafting stage and became increasingly involved
in negotiations. Id.
33 See Gantz, The Marcona Settlement New Forms of Negotiation and Compensation for Nation-
alized Property, 71 AM. J. INT'L. L. 474, n. 2 (1977). There were 87 reports of expropriatory acts
during a two year period in the early seventies. Id.
34 In contrast to the FCN program, which enhanced trade relationships with "developed" coun-
tries, the BIT program is designed to enhance United States relationships with "developing" coun-
tries. There are presently BITs in force between the United States and five countries, which include
Bangladesh, Cameroon, Grenada, Turkey, and Zaire.
35 BIPAs were activated among European countries including, Switzerland, West Germany, and
the Netherlands between 1962 and 1977. Vandevelde, supra note 32, at 208, n. 64.
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(2) to reaffirm that the protection of United States foreign investment re-
mained an important element of United States foreign policy, and
(3) to establish a body of practice to support the United States view of inter-
national law governing the protection of foreign investment.36
The resulting U.S. Model Bilateral Investment Treaty (the "Proto-
type") contains twelve substantive articles and a preamble. The twelve
articles cover the following topics: definitions37; treatment of invest-
ments38; expropriation 39; currency transfers4o; settlement of disputes4";
rights maintained by the parties42; measures not precluded by treaty4 3;
taxation'; and date of treaty enforcement 5 .
The Prototype's twelve articles are consistent with the three original
objectives of the BIT program which focus on protecting pre-existing
U.S. investment. However, the Prototype preamble expands upon these
original objectives. The preamble states that the treaty concerns the "re-
ciprocal protection" of investments, as well as, the "encouragement" of
36 Vandevelde, supra note 32, at 210 (1988).
37 Prototype, supra note 29, art. L Defines: "company of a Party", "investment", "national",
"return", and "associated activities".
38 Id., art. II. Explains that "each party shall permit and treat investment, and activities associ-
ated therewith, on a basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to investment or
associated activities of its own nationals or companies." Id.
39 Id., art. III. Binds the parties to internationally recognized standards for expropriation and
permits expropriation only for a public purpose, which must include prompt payment at fair market
value.
40 Id., art. IV. Provides that all transfers related to investment are to be made freely and without
delay in a freely convertible currency at prevailing market rate of exchange on date of transfer. This
provision restricts the transfer of expropriation compensation and preserves the rights of each party
to require reports of currency and impose income tax.
41 Id., arts. V-VIII. Article V Requires prompt consultation of the parties to resolve disputes in
connection with the treaty. Article VI requires consultation and negotiation of the parties with re-
spect to an investment dispute. Moreover, it provides the dispute resolution procedures. Article VII
explains the procedure for resolution of disputes concerning the interpretation and application of the
treaty. Article VIII simply states that provisions of Articles VI and VII shall not apply to a dispute
arising under export credit, guarantee or insurance programs.
42 Id., art. IX. Preserves various rights, such as laws and regulations of either party, interna-
tional legal obligations, and obligations assumed by either party.
43 Id., art. X. Provides that the treaty does not preclude measures by either party to ensure
public order and does not preclude special formalities connected with investment so long as the
treaty is not impaired by such actions.
4 4 Id., art. XI. Encourages both parties to seek fairness and equity in the tax treatment of invest-
ments. The provisions of the treaty apply to matters of taxation only with respect to expropriation,
transfers, and investment agreements.
45 Id., art. XII. Mandates that the treaty enter into force thirty days after the date of exchange
of instruments of ratification and remain in force for at least ten years. More importantly, this
provision permits application of the treaty to investments already existing at the time of entry into
force, as well as, those made or acquired thereafter.
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investments." "Encouragement" of investment is not within the narrow
scope of the three original objectives of the BIT program. Moreover, the
Prototype preamble states that the treaty "will stimulate the flow of pri-
vate capital and the economic development."'47 This was also not a part
of the original BIT program. Rather, the original BIT program only
sought to protect those investments already in place.4 8
B. How The Treaty Differs From Other Bilateral Investment Treaties
Although the word "encouragement" does not appear in the text of
the Treaty's preamble, the phrase "will stimulate the flow of private capi-
tal and the economic development" does appear.49 Thus, the Treaty pre-
amble emulates the Prototype by citing promotion of investment as one
of the purposes of the Treaty. Unlike the Prototype articles, however,
the substantive articles of the Treaty contain explicit provisions that are
intended to encourage investment. In this respect the Treaty also differs
from earlier enacted BITs because, like the Prototype, they lacked sub-
stantive provisions designed to encourage investment.50 The nature of
these earlier BITs demonstrates that they were designed primarily to pro-
tect investments made by each party in the territory of the other.
The enactment of the Treaty signifies a shift in the primary focus of
the BIT program from the protection of investment to the encourage-
ment of investment. Thus, the Treaty is a hybrid of the Prototype and its
progeny. Perhaps the phrase "Business and Economic Relations" within
46 Id., Preamble. Specifically, it states that the two parties have "resolved to conclude a treaty
concerning the encouragement and reciprocal protection of investment."
47 Id., Preamble. "Recognizing that agreement upon the treatment to be accorded such invest-
ment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic development of the Parties ......
48 Gudgeon, supra note 31, at 111. According to Gudgeon:
Although the titles and preambles to most of the BITs refer to the 'encouragement' as well as
the 'protection' of investments, the BIT Model was not designed with an intent to catalyze
investment decisions. Rather, the practical functions of the BIT program were conceived in
more static, protective terms, in relation to stocks of investment already in place. In fact, the
framers of the Model BIT were unaware of any proven relationship between the existence of
FCN treaties or European BIT's and investment flows. Indeed, the developers of the Model
BIT regarded the absence of evidence of a capital flow relationship as advantageous in rallying
support for the BIT program, since evidence of a positive correlation between investment trea-
ties and increased capital flow abroad could have spurred opposition by organized labor and
regional economic groups within the United States. Ia
49 Treaty, supra note 22, at 1. Specifically the Treaty states: "Recognizing that agreement upon
the treatment to be accorded such investment will stimulate the flow of private capital and the
economic development of the Parties .. " Id
50 The following countries have signed BITs with the United States which include the "treat-
ment provision," "expropriation provision," "transfers provision," and the "disputes provision" as
the four core provisions of the BIT: Egypt, Panama, Cameroon, Morocco, Zaire, Bangladesh, Haiti,
Senegal, Turkey, and Grenada.
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the title best describes the intent of the Treaty. According to the Letter
of Submittal
This treaty is expected to reinforce and to further the extraordinary recent
political and economic developments in Poland. It will serve to stimulate
growth of the private sector and of market institutions in Poland, consistent
with the economic reform program adopted by that government. In addi-
tion, the treaty will encourage, facilitate and protect U.S. investment and
business activity in Poland, which can act as an important stimulus to eco-
nomic reform. Potential U.S. investors who otherwise might perceive un-
certainties in the current business climate in Poland will find considerable
assurance in the protections provided by this treaty.51
Without question, the Treaty's primary purpose is to promote American
investments; the protection of those investments is ancillary.
The specific provisions that set the Treaty apart from the Prototype
and other BITs include: the granting of non-discriminatory treatment for
certain operational measures related to investments and commercial ac-
tivities52, the exchange of information relating to and affecting invest-
ments53, a guarantee for intellectual property rights54 , the designation of
an ombudsman office55, and the guaranteed service of government-con-
trolled tourism enterprises to U.S. investors56 . In addition, there are
some other modifications of the BIT-based provisions.5 Therefore,
although the final product does embody the core provisions proposed by
the Prototype, it is clear that the drafters incorporated these additional
provisions as a progressive effort toward enticing U.S. investors.
IV. THE TREATY'S INVESTMENT STIMULI
U.S. businesses have been apprehensive about investing in Poland.
51 Treaty, supra note 22, at v.
"While it is U.S. policy to advise potential treaty partners that conclusion of an investment
agreement with the United States does not in and of itself result in immediate increases in U.S.
investment flows, the treaty with Poland nevertheless will become a key feature in strengthening
the U.S.-Poland bilateral investment relationship."
Id.
52 Id., art. III, at 2 (Business Facilitation and Business Rights).
53 Id., art. VIII, at 8. (Exchange of Information and Transparency).
54 Id., art. IV, at 6 (Protection of Intellectual Property).
55 Id. at 15 (Side Letter stating that the Polish Government designates a Deputy President of the
Agency for Foreign Investments to serve as an "ombudsman" for U.S. investors).
56 Id. at 16 (Side Letter identifying relationship of the Treaty to the U.S.-Poland Agreement on
the Development and Facilitation of Tourism).
57 Id., Letter of Submittal, at xi. The provisions for entry of investment and repatriation of
profits differ substantively from the Prototype provisions. Specifically, the Polish government is
committed to phasing out the law prohibiting entry of foreign investment if the investment poses a
threat to state economic interests. Additionally, with respect to the repatriation of profits, the proto-
col of the Treaty provides progressively relaxed restrictions on transfers and 100 percent transfera-
bility by 1995.
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Perhaps the source of this apprehension was best described by a Depart-
ment of State official who said [in reference to Eastern Europe in general]
It is true that during the transitional phase ahead, foreign companies will
face a difficult landscape. Laws and policies will be changing. New ideas
will be clashing with old habits. Credit, banking, communications, and
other facilities for doing business will be well below Western standards, at
least in the beginning. The entrepreneurs you deal with are going to be
inexperienced and often unrealistic in their expectations. And they will be
constantly adjusting to change themselves.58
For those businesses preparing to invest in Poland's new democracy,
many unanswered questions exist. Among other things, investors are
concerned about the ability to get profits out of the country, the effect of
an inefficient bureaucracy on the ability to gain entry for investment, the
threat of expropriation by the Polish government, and the resolution of
disputes with foreign parties. Most of these concerns are addressed by
the 1990 PFIL and the Treaty.
A. Transferring Profits Out of Poland
Prior to the 1990 PFIL, Poland's Foreign Investment Law, while
imposing a few restrictions, permitted companies to freely distribute their
profits in foreign currencies.5 9 In an attempt to stabilize the economy,
the Polish government has limited the investor's freedom for distributing
profits in foreign currencies under the 1990 PFIL.
The 1990 PFIL grants the investor 6° the right to convert dividends
into foreign currency, but not with the same liberty as before.6" Specifi-
cally, the foreign currency must be purchased through an authorized for-
eign exchange bank.62 The 1990 PFIL limits the amount exchanged
through the bank to the earned export surplus of the investor.63 The
58 Address by Deputy Secretary Eagleburger, "America's Opportunities in Eastern Europe",
American Chamber of Commerce's International Forum, (Feb. 16, 1990)(available from United
States Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Current Policy No. 1250).
59 For an explanation of the 1988 law, see Piontek, Polish Foreign Investment Law 1988, 23 J.
WORLD TRADE 5, (1989); Gordon, supra note 19, at 339.
60 The term "investor" will be used to refer to the U.S. investor. The 1990 PFIL uses the term
"foreign partner." See 1990 PFIL, supra note 18.
61 1990 PFIL, supra note 18, art. 19 (1).
62 1990 Foreign Exchange Law, supra note 4, art. 24 (1). An authorized foreign exchange bank
is one which has been awarded a permit. "The Governor of the national Bank of Poland in coordi-
nation with the Minister of Finance may empower specific banks to conduct the type of activities
reserved under this Act for currency banks." Id.
63 1990 PFIL, supra note 18, art. 19 (1). This amount must be determined by an authorized
auditor auditing the annual balance. American accounting firms are presently entering the market
in Poland and, obviously, an American investor would be prudent to choose an American auditor for
arriving at a more favorable annual balance. The formula for deriving the "export surplus" is the
surplus of export proceeds over import outlays. Id.
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statute further limits the amount available for exchange by the amount of
foreign currency that the investor's foreign employees choose to purchase
from their wages."
In addition, the 1990 PFIL limits the investor to purchasing foreign
currency only up to fifteen percent of the profit realized over the export
surplus.65 This provision limits the internal convertibility of Polish zlo-
tys earned from internal sales. As a result, the above provision restricts
hard currency outflows and protects the internal convertibility of Polish
zlotys.66 However, in economically substantiated cases, the Minister of
Finance may, at the request of the investor, issue a currency permit that
entitles the investor to exchange a greater amount of foreign currency
than that provided by the law.67 These permits may be issued prior to
the issuance of the permit required for the establishment of the investor's
company. 68
The Treaty also bolsters the repatriation guarantees of the 1990
PFIL.6 9 Article V of the Treaty provides that "[e]ach party shall permit
all transfers related to an investment of commercial activity to be made
freely and without delay into and out of its territory."70 The term
"transfers" is specifically limited to six types of transactions, although
the six types cover nearly all conceivable types of transactions. 71 The
64 Id. at arts. 32(2), 32(3), 32(3a).
65 I d at art. 19(2).
66 Slupinski, supra note 19, at 29, n. 150. "Polish efforts to introduce partial internal convertibil-
ity of the local currency resulted in the enactment of the [1990 PFIL]. The law is intended to
eliminate the dual monetary system existing in Poland. At the same time, it is seen as the first step
toward full convertibility of the Polish zloty in the near future." Id. Gordon, supra note 19, at 352,
offers an illustration of how this law would operate in practice:
assume that a Polish-American Joint Venture Company is 50 percent owned by a U.S. investor
and 50 percent owned by a Polish investor. During 1990 (calendar and fiscal years coincide),
the company earns $100,000 in profits. The audit confirms that 60 percent of the profits are
export surplus (demonstrating, not coincidentally, the tremendous importance of the choice of
auditors and auditing procedures). The U.S. investor is entitled to purchase $33,000 of hard
currency without need of special authorization. That number is reached by adding the U.S.
partner's half share of export surplus (50 percent of $60,000 = $30,000) plus 15 percent of its
half share of "remaining" profits (15 percent of [50 percent of $40,000] = $3,000). From that
maximum transferable amount of $33,000, the government will deduct from their pay in zlotys
any hard currency purchased by the venture's foreign employees.
67 1990 PFIL, supra note 18, art. 19(4). This is the amount exceeding the amount allowed for
the convertibility of external profits, as well as, internal profits. Or, as the law states: "The amount
exceeding the amount mentioned under paragraphs 1 and 2 above." Id
68 Id.
69 See Treaty, supra note 22, art. V, Transfers.
70 Id. at 6.
71 Transfers include: "(a) returns; (b) compensation pursuant to Article VII [Expropriation]; (c)
payments arising out of an investment dispute or commercial dispute; (d) payments made under a
contract, including amortization of principal and accrued interest payments made pursuant to a loan
agreement; (e) proceeds from the sale or liquidation of all or any part of an investment; and (f)
additional contributions to capital for the maintenance or development of an investment." Id.
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language "without delay" reassures the investor that his or her money
will not sit idly during the exchange process. 72
However, the Treaty's Protocol provision places restraints on an in-
vestor's ability to transfer funds out of Poland under the transfer provi-
sions of Article V. 73 Instead of allowing "all transfers ... to be made
freely,"' 74 the Protocol, like the 1990 PFIL, allows only a percentage of
the internal profits to be transferred75. Nonetheless, the Protocol allows
a graduating percentage over the next five years and guarantees the one
hundred percent transfer of profits by 1996.76
If Poland introduces full convertibility before 1996, the Protocol
provides that transfers of profits will be unrestricted from the date that
full conversion is introduced.77 Furthermore, the Protocol guarantees
that bank deposits held within Poland will receive a positive real rate of
interest" and profits which cannot be transferred (according to the grad-
uated scale) can be invested in a bank account that yields a positive real
rate of interest 79. Any problems that an American company might en-
counter with respect to the transferring of funds can be brought to Po-
land's Deputy President of the Agency for Foreign Investments.80
Under the Treaty, the Deputy President acts as an ombudsman, and the
72 Treaty, supra note 22, Protocol, par. 2, at 14. The Treaty's Protocol defines "without delay"
to mean that "transfers should be made in accordance with normal banking and commercial prac-
tices." The Protocol further states that the parties understand "that normal banking and commer-
cial practices in the Republic of Poland are generally governed by the National Bank of Poland."
Moreover, it states that "[u]nder current provisions issued by the Bank, investment companies can
obtain foreign exchange within three working days if such foreign exchange is obtained from a bank
licensed to conduct foreign exchange transactions, and eight working days in all other instances in
connection with payments for imported goods and related services." Id
73 Id.
74 Id., art. V, Transfers, at 6.
75 Id., Protocol, par. 4, at 14.
76 Id. at 15. Specifically, the Protocol states:
Notwithstanding the provisions of Article V, paragraph 1, with regard to the Republic of Po-
land the transfer of profits derived from an investment exceeding the amount transferrable
under Article 19, paragraph 1, of the Law of December 23, 1988 on Economic Activity with the
Participation of Foreign Parties shall be made according to the following schedule. As of 1st
January 1992:20 percent of the remaining profits gained in 1990-1991 and not previously trans-
ferred. As of 1st January 1993: 35 percent of the remaining profits gained in 1990-1992 and not
previously transferred. As of 1st of January 1994: 50 percent of the remaining profits gained in
1990-1993 and not previously transferred. As of Ist of January 1995: 80 percent of the remain-
ing profits gained in 1990-1994 and not previously transferred. As of Ist January 1996: 100
percent of the remaining profits gained in 1990-1995 and not previously transferred, and 100
percent of profits gained thereafter.
Id.
77 Id. at 14.
78 Id. para. 3, at 14.
79 Id. par. 5, at 15.
80 Id. Side Letter from Robert A. Mosbacher, U.S. See. of Commerce to Dariust Ledworowski,
Polish Under-See. of State, Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, at 15.
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Deputy President's office is commanded to assist "investors experiencing
difficulties in repatriating profits and obtaining foreign exchange.""1
In comparison to the 1990 PFIL's transfers provisions, the most
striking feature of the Treaty's transfers provision is the guarantee for
one hundred percent profit transfers by 1996.82 In addition, the commit-
ment by Poland for limiting the period of exchange to a specific number
of days is a step forward from the 1990 PFIL. The Treaty's guarantees
provide more incentive to the American investor than that already pro-
vided by the 1990 PFIL, but the guarantees are not so substantial as to
single-handedly draw an American investor into Poland. Rather, at the
margin, the guarantees may tip the balance in favor of investing in
Poland.
B. Entry and Registration of Investments
The 1990 PFIL requires that an investor obtain a permit in order to
establish a company. 3 An application for a permit should include the
information specifically outlined by the 1990 PFIL. While it is not a
guarantee, the 1990 PFIL states that a decision on whether to issue the
permit should be made within two months from the date of the filing of
the application. 5 If a permit is granted, the Company must then apply
for registration with the court in accordance with the regulations of the
commercial register.8 6
The issuance of permits is the responsibility of the President of the
Foreign Investment Agency. 7 A permit will be issued if the business
81 Id. at 16.
82 See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
83 1990 PFIL, supra note 18, art. V (1). "The establishment of the Company shall require a
permit. The issuance of the permit authorizes the commencement of business activity indicated
herein."
84 Id., art. 10 (1)&(2). These provisions state:
An application for a permit should set forth: /1/ partners; /2/ subject and scope of the business
activity of the Company, including export and imports activities; /3/ anticipated term of a
Company; /4/ funds required by the Company to commence business, including equity; /5/
ratio between each Shareholder's contribution to the Company's equity and the form of contri-
butions; /6/ seat of the Company and the location of its production facilities.
The application should also include the Company's founding act, which is required by the Commer-
cial Code; documentary evidence of the legal status and financial condition of prospective sharehold-
ers; and a feasibility study of the proposed Company. All of this information can be either submitted
in Polish, or in a foreign language, so long as a certified translation into Polish is provided. Id.
85 Id., art.10 (4).
86 Id., art. 12 (1).
87 Id. at art. 4 (1). This article provides:
The Foreign Investment Agency, hereinafter referred to as 'the Agency', is hereby established as
the bureau of the President of the Agency. The structure and operating principles of the
Agency are outlined in its charter conferred by the Prime Minister. (2) The President of the
Agency is the central administrative authority on foreign investment, responsible to the Prime
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intends to ensure: (1) the introduction of modem technologies and man-
agement methods into the national economy; (2) the provision of goods
and services for export; (3) the improvement in the supply of modem and
high quality products and services to the domestic market; and (4) the
protection of the environment.8 8 Because these standards are imprecise,
these restrictions will rarely deny a permit to a potential investor.
Another provision of the 1990 PFIL justifies the denial of a permit
whenever the business poses a threat.to Poland's economic interests; vio-
lates the environmental standards requirements; threatens Poland's se-
curity and defense interests; or threatens the protection of Poland's
secrets. 9 If a permit is denied because the business threatens Poland's
economic, security, or defense interests, or endangers Poland's secrets, an
explanation for the denial is not required.' The investor may appeal a
denial to the President of the Agency for re-examination, but may not
appeal to the Supreme Administrative Court.91 However, the appeal
must occur within fourteen days from the date of the initial denial.92
The Treaty grants additional guarantees to U.S. investors which are
not afforded by the 1990 PFIL. In the Treaty's Side Letter on the Entry
of Investment, Poland promises to permit entry of United States invest-
ments automatically within sixty days from the application unless the
investor is otherwise notified.93 Under the Treaty, as under the 1990
PFIL, a permit will be denied "only if it presents a threat to state eco-
nomic interests, to national security or to the environment."94 With re-
Minister. (3) The Prime Minister, on the advice of the Minister of Foreign Economic Relations
appoints and dismisses the President of the Agency. (4) The responsibilities of the President of
the Agency include: /1/ formulating the objectives and implementing the policy of the State on
investment cooperation with foreign countries; /2/ stimulating and undertaking measures to
increase the interest of foreign parties in pursuing economic activity in the Polish People's Re-
public in the areas, and within limits, corresponding with the interests of the national economy;
/3/ supervising the compliance of the activities of entities, operating under this Law with its
provisions and the conditions set forth in the permit for the establishment of a Company; /4/
performing other responsibilities as provided by in this Law. (5) The Foreign Investment
Council shall constitute the advisory body of the President. The members of the Council are
appointed and recalled by the Minister of Foreign Economic Relations on the advice of the
President of the Agency.
88 Id., art. 5(2).
89 Id., art. 6 (1).
90 Id at (2).
91 Id at (3)&(4).
92 Id.
93 Treaty, supra note 22. Side letter from Carla A. Hills, U. S. Trade Rep. Executive Office of
The President, Washington, DC, to Dariust Ledworowski, Polish Under/Sec. of State, Ministry of
Foreign Economic Relations, at 22 [hereinafter Letter on Entry of Investment]. Specifically, the side
letter states: "A permit for entry of United States investments shall be issued automatically within
sixty days of submission of an application unless the U.S. investor is notified in writing of the denial
and the grounds and reasons thereof within sixty days from the date of the submission." Id
94 Id. The Treaty's Letter of Submittal states that "according to the Government of Poland, in
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spect to environmental threats, the Letter on Entry of Investment states
that "the standards used shall be those applied to domestic enter-
prises."95 This provision may prove to be significant for potential inves-
tors, because no such standard presently exists under the 1990 PFIL.
Neither the 1990 PFIL, nor the Treaty contains a standard for determin-
ing whether an investor poses a threat to Poland's economic interest.
However, the Letter on Entry of Investment assures the investor that:
"the criterion of 'threat to state economic interests' shall be used only in
exceptional cases and not for the purpose of limiting competition." 96
The most promising statement for investors in the Letter on Entry
of Investment is the assurance that, within two years from the Treaty's
entry of enforcement, the United States and Poland will consider narrow-
ing the scope of the investment permit requirements and subsequently
phase out such permits. 97 While this statement does little for the existing
investor, the elimination of the permit process should certainly whet the
potential investor's appetite. Similarly, the current provision providing
for the automatic issuance of permits within sixty days of application
should also appeal to the potential investor.
C. The Threat of Expropriation
Within the provisions for regulating foreign companies' banking ac-
tivities, the 1990 PFIL provides a guarantee against expropriation by the
Polish Government.98 In order to acquire such a guarantee, the investor
must apply to the Minister of Finance requesting a guarantee of indemni-
fication against nationalization or expropriation.99 After the request is
made, the Minister of Finance must grant the guarantee.'00 The guaran-
tee is only valid if the expropriation has been applied uniformly to all
foreign investors. In other words, if an investor has been singled out for
expropriation, the guarantee is meaningless. Besides the 1990 PFIL, the
Polish Constitution also addresses the issue of expropriation. The Con-
stitution has recently been amended to provide that "The Polish State
recent practice, this law has been applied to preclude investments only very rarely." Treaty, supra
note 22, Letter of Submittal, at XI.
95 Letter on Entry of Investment, supra note 92.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id., art. 22 (6). "The Minister of Finance, upon the application of a foreign Shareholder,
issues him with a compensation payment guarantee to the amount equal to the value of the Com-
pany's assets due him, in the event of a loss resulting from a decision of any State authorities in
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protects property and guarantees private property. Expropriation is per-
mitted only for a public purpose and for just compensation."'' 0 1
The Treaty contains numerous provisions which lessen the threat of
expropriation. Article VIII of the Treaty provides numerous assurances
to the U.S. investor that go beyond the guarantees in the 1990 PFIL °2
These assurances are based on the general rule of international law that
municipal law cannot prevail over the international obligations of the
country. 0 3 Thus, Poland cannot invoke its municipal law, including its
Constitution, as an international legal justification for failing to adhere to
its obligations under a treaty." 0
The Treaty states that investments may only be expropriated if done
so for a public purpose and in a nondiscriminatory manner. The treaty
further provides for prompt, adequate, and effective compensation in the
event of such expropriation.10 5 All measures which effectively deprive
an investor of his interest and can be likened to expropriation are cov-
ered. Compensation must be equivalent to the "fair market value of the
expropriated investment immediately before the expropriatory action
was taken or became publicly known, whichever is earlier."10 6 The com-
pensation must "be paid without delay, include interest at a commer-
cially reasonable rate . . . from the date of expropriation, be fully
realizable, freely transferable, and calculated on the basis of the prevail-
ing market rate of exchange for commercial transactions on the date of
the expropriation."'0 7 An investor should observe that a specific valua-
101 Polish Constitution, art. VII, as amended by law #75, para. 444 (1989).
102 Treaty, supra note 22, art. VII, Compensation for Expropriation, at 7.
103 G. SCHWARZENBERGER & E.D. BRowN, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 39 (6th
ed. 1976).
"[fB]efore any international organ, municipal law cannot prevail over a State's international
obligations, whether these are founded on international treaties, rules of international custom-
ary law or general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. On the international level a
State is estopped from arguing that its own constitution or any of its own constitutional organs
prevent it from complying with international law. Any international entity which has con-
tracted international obligations must, if necessary, change its domestic law so as to be able to
fulfil its international commitments. The fact that a State applies a measure which is contrary
to international law to its own citizens is neither a justification nor an excuse for any breach of
international law [citations omitted]."
Id.
104 See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 63 A.J.I.L.
875, art. 27.
105 Treaty, supra note 22, VII (1). "Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either
directly or indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization ('expropria-
tion') except for a public purpose, in a nondiscriminatory manner, upon payment of prompt, ade-
quate and effective compensation, and in accordance with due process of law and the general
principles of treatment provided for in Article 11 (6)." Id
106 Id at 7-8.
107 Id. at 8.
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tion method for compensating such losses is not provided by the Treaty.
The right to "prompt review" of an act of expropriation and the
ensuing compensation is granted by the Treaty."'8 The expropriation
and any subsequent compensation will be examined by the appropriate
judicial or administrative authorities to determine whether the proce-
dures are in compliance with the principle of "prompt review."1"9 The
Treaty also extends nondiscriminatory treatment to investment losses
due to war or other civil disturbances. 110
In addition to the Treaty and the 1990 PFIL, the investor can rely
on U.S. statutory provisions to discourage other countries from expropri-
ating investment. Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 ("Section 301")
authorizes the United States Trade Representative to take action against
a foreign country that acts unjustifiably, unreasonably or discriminatorily
to burden or restrict U.S. commerce.111 The 1988 Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act enhances the Administration's power to retaliate
against unfair traders with the new "super" 301. Under the new section
301 the United States Trade Representative has the authority to take
retaliatory action against goods or services of a foreign country in an
amount that is equivalent to the burden or restriction being imposed on
United States commerce by that country." 2
In addition to the protection against unfair trade practices afforded
by Section 301, the investor also has the option to insure against expro-
priation through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation
("OPIC"). OPIC is responsible for administering the political risk insur-
ance of the United States government. The investment guarantee agree-
ment between the United States and Poland overcomes the obstacles of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961,113 and makes this investment insur-
ance available in Poland." 4 Other options potentially available to inves-
108 Id., para. 2, at 8.
109 Id
110 Id, par. 3, at 8. "Nationals or companies of either Party whose investments suffer losses in the
territory of the other Party owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, state of national emer-
gency, insurrection, civil disturbance or other similar events shall be accorded nondiscriminatory
treatment by such other Party as regards any measures it adopts in relation to such losses." Id
111 19 U.S.C.A. § 2411 (West 1988). This statute defines "commerc" to include "foreign direct
investment by United States persons with implications for trade in goods or services." Id
§ 241 l(d)(1)(B). "Unreasonable acts" include those that deny "fair and equitable (I) opportunities
for the establishment of an enterprise, (II) provision of adequate and effective protection of intellec-
tual property rights, or (III) market opportunities . Id § 2411 (d)(3)(B)(i).
112 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (a)(3).
113 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370 (West 1988). This Act prohibits assistance to various foreign countries.
Section f prohibits assistance to any Communist country, including Poland. Id. § 2370(f)(1).
114 Poland-United States: Investment Guaranty Agreement [Done at Warsaw, October 13, 1989],
28 LL.M. 1393 (1989). This agreement does not come into effect until either Poland is added to 22
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tors include political risk insurance from the World Bank's Multilateral
Investment Guaranty Agency ("MIGA") and from insurers in the pri-
vate sector.
The significance of the Treaty's expropriation provision rests upon
the guarantee of compensation without delay and the guarantee of
prompt review to determine if compensation is adequate. These guaran-
tees are far more assuring to the investor than those provided by the 1990
PFIL, which only grants indemnification following application by the in-
vestor after being subjected to an across-the-board expropriation.
D. Settling Investment Disputes
While the 1990 PFIL does not specifically address arbitration as an
option for settling disputes, it clearly states that Polish law will apply in
the case of a dispute involving the investment regardless of whether the
dispute is settled by a Polish court or by a Polish arbitration tribunal.11 5
However, investors would be wise to negotiate arbitration clauses which
select third countries as the forum for arbitration and select a governing
law that is satisfactory to both parties. When an agreement for gov-
erning law cannot be reached, the most popular neutral fora include
Stockholm and Vienna since these countries tend to apply the traditions
of the western legal culture." 6 As a member of the New York Conven-
tion, Poland is obligated to enforce judgments rendered by tribunals in
other countries that are parties to the New York Convention.1 7
The Treaty provides that an investment dispute between a party and
a national or company of the other party may be submitted for arbitra-
tion after six months.11 The investor would not be forced to exhaust
local remedies before proceeding with arbitration. Such disputes include
those relating to rights granted under the Treaty and those dealing with
the interpretation of an investment authorization." Included among
permissible arbitral fora are the International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes ("ICSID") 120, the Additional Facility of the Cen-
U.S.C. § 2199(f) which allows assistance to Yugoslavia and the People's Republic of China, or Presi-
dent Bush waives Poland from the restrictions of the Foreign Assistance Act.
115 1990 PFIL, supra note 18, arts. 2 § 2, 31 § 1.
116 Slupinski, supra note 19, at 35-37.
117 United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S., art.
III, at 38.
118 Treaty, supra note 22, art. IX, par. 3(a), at 9.
119 Id., par. 1, at 8.
120 Id., par. 3(a), at 9. The Treaty provides that each Party "consents to the submission of an
investment dispute for settlement by conciliation or binding arbitration to the Centre, in the event
that the Republic of Poland becomes a party to the Convention on the Settlement of Investment
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tre12 , and any other arbitral institution that is mutually selected12 2 . As
acknowledged by the Letter of Submittal, the Treaty specifies the availa-
bility of the Additional Facility or of ad hoc arbitration because Poland
has not adhered to the ICSID Convention. 123 However, Poland has indi-
cated its intent to become a member of ICSID in the near future.
124
V. CONCLUSION
Clearly, the Treaty provides incentives for U.S. investment in Po-
land which are well beyond the incentives currently embodied in Polish
law. If the Treaty goes into effect, U.S. investors will most likely pay
heed to these incentives and increase their activities in Poland. This is
why both countries should seek ratification for the Treaty without fur-
ther delay. However, even with all of the incentives and favoritism
granted to the investor, risks are still inherent in any country such as
Poland that lacks the adequate infrastructure for harboring an efficient
market economy. Thus, for any potential investor, the rule of thumb is
to act cautiously.
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States done at Washington, March 18, 1965." Id.,
par. 3(b)(i), at 9.
121 The Additional Facility of the Centre is a tribunal established under the arbitration rules of
the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"). See ICSID Hand-
book for the Additional Facility, Introductory Notes. On September 27, 1978, the Administrative
Council of the Centre authorized the Secretariat to administer at the request of the parties concerned
certain proceedings between States and nationals of other States which fall outside the scope of the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States.
They are (i) conciliation or arbitration proceedings for the settlement of investment disputes arising
between parties one of which is not a Contracting State or a national of a Contracting State; (ii)
conciliation or arbitration proceedings between parties at least one of which is a Contracting State or
a national of a Contracting State for the settlement of disputes that do not directly arise out of an
investment; and (iii) fact-finding proceedings. Id.
122 Treaty, supra note 22, art. IX, para. 3(a), at 9.
123 Treaty, supra note 22, Letter of Submittal, at IX.
124 Id.
